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The Battle for Western Europe, Fall 1944

An Operational Assessment - Twentieth-Century Battles

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The Battle for Western Europe, Fall 1944

By: John A. Adams
Narrated by: Jim Woods
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This engrossing and meticulously researched volume reexamines the decisions made by Dwight D. Eisenhower and his staff in the crucial months leading up to the Battle of the Bulge. In late August 1944, defeat of the Wehrmacht seemed assured. On December 16, however, the Germans counterattacked. Received wisdom says that Eisenhower's Broad Front strategy caused his armies to stall in early September, and his subsequent failure to concentrate his forces brought about deadlock and opened the way for the German attack. Arguing to the contrary, John A. Adams demonstrates that Eisenhower and his staff at SHAEF had a good campaign strategy, refined to reflect developments on the ground, which had an excellent chance of destroying the Germans west of the Rhine.

©2010 John Adams (P)2015 Redwood Audiobooks Military Dwight Eisenhower War
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Critic reviews

"A book that is long overdue." (David Zabecki, author, Steel Wind: Colonel Georg Bruchmuller and the Birth of Modern Artillery)
All stars
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I both listened to and read this as part of my PhD research into the North West Europe campaign. As an operational assessment it is thorough and analytical, with an academic rigour, though in fairness he relies mostly on secondary sources. The author does a good job of walking through the principal elements of the campaign from mid-August to just up the start of the German Ardennes offensive. There is justifiably a heavy emphasis on logistics and how that dictates some of the dynamics of the campaign. All of this is done with precision and clarity. As a Brit, I wholly accept his criticisms of Montgomery which are laid out with legalistic robustness. Equally, he finds much to criticise in the decisions and actions of Patton and particularly Bradley as he fritters 12th Army Group's supplies and manpower in a series of ill-conducted battles from Aachen to Lorraine.

I have three areas of discomfort, though. First is that whilst he castigates Montgomery as insubordinate (which he is), he is much softer on Bradley and Patton, despite the fact that they are guilty of the same insubordination and mendacity that he beats Monty with. Second, and this is maybe a minor gripe, he is keen to suggest operational alternatives to those adopted in reality by American arms. I feel uncomfortable about the extent of this, especially coming from an author who appears to have no military background himself.

My biggest gripe, however, is in his assessment of Eisenhower. Having forensically demonstrated that Ike's instructions are routinely subverted and ignored by all of his key lieutenants, he holds back from the obvious conclusion that Ike cannot make his orders stick. This despite the fact that he quotes from contemporaries (including Ike supporters) to that effect on numerous occasions. He does a solid job on tracing the insubordinate and insolent approach taken by Montgomery, but there is an equally strong case to be set forth as to how Ike changes his mind and direction after each significant meeting with one or other of his senior generals. This is as true of his engagement with Bradley and Patton as it is with his interactions with Monty and so gives the lie to this being a "coalition" issue driven by national sensitivities. Equally, he overlooks how the "constructive ambiguity" that Ike adopts across the board in terms of keeping everyone "on the bus" contributes to the confusion and almost invites "misinterpretation".

This drives the campaign to resemble what Monty feared; an "attack everywhere" approach as he fails to rein in commanders; irrespective of their nationality. As a result, Montgomery, Bradley and Patton all contribute to the continuation of supply constraints and the frittering of opportunities to inflict decisive defeats upon the enemy and so extending the war. The closest he comes is either criticising some of Ike's directives for not being very well-written, or that "no one else would have done better".

After all, the clue is in Ike's job title: Supreme Allied Commander. It just felt very odd to lay out the case and yet not draw that conclusion when it pervades the narrative.

A final point would be that the narrator was not the best choice as his pronunciation of many French locations is a bit off; transplanting a few to Italy; so Boulogne becomes Bologna and the Moselle becomes the Mossella; maybe there is a river in Italy with that name. OK, I am being churlish.

There is much to admire in this book as a solid narrative on the campaign during a critical period, but decide for yourself as to the validity of the conclusions.

Intelligent study, but some questionable analysis

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