In July 1974, Richard Nixon signed the law creating the Congressional Budget Office — reluctantly, because the new agency curtailed his budgetary power at the worst possible political moment. He signed because he had no capital left to veto. Half a century later, the CBO employs 275 analysts and no serious economist on any part of the political spectrum proposes its abolition. Institutions that seem politically impossible before they exist become ordinary within a generation.Chapter 13 of OACRA takes that lesson as its starting point to confront the question the preceding chapters left unanswered: who is actually going to vote to build this? Even the most technically rigorous institutional design fails if it ignores the political economy of its own adoption. And OACRA's political economy reveals a structural imbalance that this chapter maps with precision: the losers — legislators who forfeit discretion, parties with rigid discipline, rent-seeking interest groups, the executive — hold significantly more veto power than the winners. Citizens gain transparency; citizens do not cast the constitutional vote.The chapter builds the complete map of that force field. It identifies who loses what, and why the intensity of opposition varies: the technically competent legislator sees a high ICL score as an electoral differentiator, not a threat. It works through the self-binding paradox using evidence from Mexico's IFE and Latin American central bank autonomy, and it constructs the minimum winning coalition required to move the reform forward. Opportunity windows are specific: massive legislative corruption scandals, democratic transitions, constitutional reforms already underway for other reasons. Without a window, the status quo has natural inertia that no design can overcome.The chapter also functions as a resistance manual: audience-specific communication framing, strategic concessions that preserve the design's core integrity (voluntary pilot phase, conservative Semáforo thresholds), red lines that don't (political control over the Technical Council, discretionary budgeting, non-public evaluations), and four failure scenarios with recovery strategies. A differentiated viability typology for Latin American contexts — from Uruguay and Costa Rica with a 7–10 year horizon to Venezuela and Nicaragua where OACRA remains premature — closes the argument. The politics of the possible varies by country.The conclusion is neither optimistic nor pessimistic. It is conditional. OACRA is politically viable, but only under specific conditions this chapter identifies with exactness.🔹 OACRA — Algorithmic Office for Enhanced Regulatory QualityJesús Bernal Allende | Escuela del Deber-Optimizar y la Soberanía de la Evidenciahttps://a.co/d/09Xzy0z8 🌐 https://deber-optimizar.mx/en/ 🔗 https://www.linkedin.com/in/jesus-bernal-allende-030b2795